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We explore the possible connections between the dynamic behaviour of
a system and Turing universality in terms of the system’s ability to (ef-
fectively) transmit and manipulate information. Some arguments will
be provided using a defined compression-based transition coefficient
which quantifies the sensitivity of a system to being programmed. In
the same spirit, a list of conjectures concerning the ability of Busy
Beaver Turing machines to perform universal computation will be for-
mulated. The main working hypothesis is that universality is deeply
connected to the qualitative behaviour of a system, particularly to its
ability to react to external stimulus–as it needs to be programmed–and
to its capacity for transmitting this information.
Classification: 89.75.-k, 05.10.-a, 89.20.-a, 89.20.Ff
Keywords: dynamic behaviour, elementary cellular automata, small
Turing machines, algorithmic complexity, computational (Turing) uni-
versality, Busy Beaver machines, sensitivity, phase transitions, theory
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1. Introduction
In [20] an investigation of the dynamic properties of computing ma-
chines using a general lossless compression approach led to reason-
able classifications of elementary Cellular Automata (CA) and other
systems, classifications corresponding to Wolfram’s four classes of be-
haviour [18]. In the spirit of other analytical concepts for scale pre-
dictability (for example, Lyapunov exponents), but employing different
means, this compression-based method also led to the definition of a
phase transition coefficient as a way of detecting a system’s (in)stability
vis-a`-vis its initial conditions and of measuring its dynamic ability to
carry information. A conjecture relating the magnitude of this coeffi-
cient and the capability and efficiency with which a system performs
universal computation was introduced. In this paper the conjecture is
developed further, with some additional arguments.
In [21], a related conjecture concerning other kinds of simply defined
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2programs was presented, establishing that all Busy Beaver Turing ma-
chines may be capable of universal computation, as they seem to share
some of the informational and complex properties of systems capable of
universal computational behaviour. The conjecture will be regarded in
light of algorithmic complexity, particularly of Bennett’s logical depth
[1], and will be reconnected to the first conjecture via the dynami-
cal properties of these machines through the compression-based phase
transition coefficient.
Some definitions of concepts to be discussed either as foundations of
these possible new connections, or as evidence for making such claims
will be introduced first. The investigation is meant to be an exploration
of empirical observations through quantitative measures which attempt
to capture qualitative properties of the dynamic behaviour of systems
capable of computational universality.
1.1 Preliminaries
Proof-of-universality results for simple programs have traditionally re-
lied on localized structures (or “particles”), as distinguished from rel-
atively uniform regions. This means that a measure of entropy of a
system will tend to be below its theoretical maximum. At the same
time, however, this “particle-like” behaviour is, and must in principle
be unpredictable for the system to reach computational universality.
StephenWolfram has classified all the one-dimensional nearest neigh-
borhood CA into four classes [18]: (i) Class 1: ordered behaviour; (ii)
Class 2: periodic behaviour; (iii) Class 3: random or chaotic behaviour;
(iv) Class 4: complex behaviour. The first two are totally predictable.
Random CA are unpredictable. Somewhere in between, in the transi-
tion from periodic to chaotic, complex, interesting behaviour can occur.
One of Wolfram’s open problems [17] in cellular automata, for ex-
ample, is the question of the computational universality of a system
belonging to Class 3 (random-looking, such as rule 30) for which an
entropy measure remains near its maximum at every time step, and
which is unlikely to show any “particle-like” behaviour. The question
is whether such a “hot system” can carry information and be pro-
grammed. The techniques to prove such a system universal may require
methods different from those hitherto used for systems in which struc-
tures can be distinguished and which can therefore be made to carry
information through them. The common belief is that these kinds of
systems may be powerful enough but are just too complicated, perhaps
even impossible to program. The encoding required to deal with the
sophistication of a class III rule cellular automaton would itself prob-
ably have to possess the sophistication of a computationally universal
system. This brings us to Wolfram’s PCE, which states that almost all
processes that are not obviously simple can be viewed as computations
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3of equivalent sophistication ([18], pp. 5 and 716-717).
1.2 The behaviour of simple programs
In 1970, Conway invented an automaton, which was popularised by
Gardner [9] and was known as the Game of Life. It was proved that
Life was capable of universal computation [3]. The proof of universality
uses what in the jargon of CA are known as gliders, glider guns, and
eaters, that is, structures to carry and manipulate information through
the system (by combining such emergent propagating structures one
can simulate logic gates and circuits).
Langton’s ant [11] is a two-dimensional Turing machine with 2 sym-
bols and 4 states following a set of very simple rules 1. In [8], a very
simple construction is presented which proves that Langton’s ant is
also capable of universal computation.
But an exhaustive exploration of one-dimensional elementary CA
(that by most standards would be considered the simplest possible
CA) unlike any previous system that has been constructed, was under-
taken in [18]. The rule with number 110 (and equivalent rules: 124,
137 and 193) in Wolfram’s numbering scheme, presenting the charac-
teristic “particle-like” structures, turned out to be capable of universal
computation [18, 5]. Rule 110 can be set up with initial configurations
that have signals transmitted in the form of collisions of “particle-like”
dynamical structures, simulating a variant of a tag system, another
rewriting system capable of universal computation.
The proofs of universality of all these systems imply that their dy-
namics are unpredictable. The notion of universality implies the ex-
istence of undecidable problems related to most questions concerning
these machines. Questions related to these simple dynamical systems
cannot therefore be algorithmically answered. From which it follows
that undecidability is a measure of the unpredictability of a system
associated with its dynamical behaviour.
1.3 Quantitative measures of qualitative behaviour
Definition 1 [10, 6, 12]. KU (s) = min{|p|, U(p) = s} where |p| is
the length of p measured in bits.
A measure of complexity is derived by combining the algorithmic
complexity describing a system and the time it takes to produce a
string. Bennett’s concept of Logical Depth [1, 2] is a complexity mea-
1(a) If the machine head is on a black square, it turns 90 degrees right and moves
forward one unit. (b) If the head is on a white square, it turns 90 degrees left and
moves forward one unit. (c) When the head leaves a square, it prints the opposite
colour.
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4sure capturing the structure of a string defined by the time that a Tur-
ing machine takes to reproduce the said string from its (near) shortest
description. Formally,
Definition 2. A string’s logical depth D is given by D(s)=min{t(p) :
(|p| < |pi|) ∨ U(p) = s}
2
According to this measure, the longer it takes, the more complex
the string. Complex objects are therefore those which can be seen as
“containing internal evidence of a nontrivial causal history.”
2. Compression-based phase transition coefficient
A measure based on the change of the asymptotic direction of the size
of the compressed evolutions of a system for different initial configu-
rations (following a proposed Gray-code enumeration of initial config-
urations) was presented in [20]. It gauged the resiliency or sensitivity
of a system vis-a`-vis its initial conditions. This phase transition coeffi-
cient led to an interesting characterisation and classification of systems,
which when applied to elementary CA, yielded exactly Wolfram’s four
classes of systems behaviour, with no human intervention. The co-
efficient works by compressing the changes of the different evolutions
through time, normalised by evolution space, and it is rooted in the
concept of algorithmic complexity, being an upper bound of the algo-
rithmic complexity of a string. The more compressed a string, the less
algorithmically complex.
Let the characteristic exponent ctn be defined as the mean of the ab-
solute values of the differences of the compressed lengths of the outputs
of the system M running over the initial segment of initial conditions
ij with j = {1, . . . , n} following the numbering scheme devised in [20]
based on a Gray-code optimal enumeration scheme, running for t steps
in intervals of n. Formally,
Definition 3. ctn = |C(|Mt(i1))−C(|Mt(i2))|+ . . .+ |C(|Mt(in−1))−
C(|Mt(in))|/t(n− 1).
Definition 4. Let C denote the transition coefficient of a system U de-
fined as C(U) = f ′(Sc), the derivative of the line that fits the sequence
Sc by finding the least-squares as described in [20] with Sc = S(c
n
t ) for
a fixed n and t.
The value C(U), based on the phase transition coefficient, is a stable
2Bennett provides a careful elaboration [1] of the notion of logical depth taking
into account near-shortest programs as well as the shortest ones.
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5indicator of the degree of the qualitative dynamical change of a system
U . The larger the derivative, the greater the change. According to C,
rule numbers such as 0 and 30 appear close to each other both because
they remain the same despite the change of initial conditions, and
because their evolution cannot be perturbed. The measure indicates
that rules like rule 0 or rule 30 are also incapable of or inefficient at
transmitting any information, given that they do not react to changes
in the input of the system. Odd as it may seem, this is because there is
no change in the qualitative behaviour of these CA when feeding them
with different inputs, regardless of how different the inputs may be–rule
0 remains entirely blank while 30 remains mostly random-looking, with
no apparent emergent coherent propagating structures (other than the
regular and linear pattern on one of the sides).
On the other hand, rules such as rule 122 and rule 89 appear next
to each other as the most sensitive to initial conditions, because as the
investigation proves, they are both highly sensitive to initial conditions
and present phase transitions which dramatically change their qualita-
tive behaviour when starting from one or another initial configuration.
This means that rules 122 and 89 can be more successfully used to
transmit information from the input to the output.
2.1 Connecting dynamic behaviour and Turing universality
Evidently if a system is completely predictable and therefore dynami-
cally trivial, it is decidable, and therefore not Turing universal. Rule
110 should therefore not be very predictable according to the phase
transition measure, but at the same time we can expect it to be ver-
satile enough to produce the variety needed to behave as a universal.
Rule 110 is one rule about which my own phase transition classification
says that, despite showing some sensitivity, it also shows some stability.
Which means that one can say with some degree of certainty how it will
look (and behave) for certain steps and certain initial configurations,
unlike those at the top.
This is acknowledged by Wolfram himself when discussing
rule 54 ( [18] page 697): ‘It could be that if one went just a
little further in looking at initial conditions one would see more
complicated behaviour. And it could be that even the structures
shown above can be combined to produce all the richness that is
needed for universality. But it could also be that whatever one
does rule 54 will always in the end just show purely repetitive or
nested behaviour–which cannot on its own support universality.”
For every CA rule, there is a definite (often undecidable) answer
to the question whether or not it is capable of universal computation
(or in reachability terms, whether a CA will evolve into a certain con-
figuration). The question only makes sense if the evolution of a CA
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the initial configuration once and for all (there would be no way to
input an instruction and carry out an arbitrary computation).
An obvious feature of universal systems is that they need to be capa-
ble of carrying information by reflecting changes made to the input and
transmitted to the output. In attempting to determine whether a sys-
tem is capable of reaching universal computation, one may ask whether
a system is capable of some minimal versatility in the first place, and
how efficiently it can transmit information. And this is what the phase
transition measures–it indicates how well a system manages to respond
to an input. Obviously, a system such as rule 0 or rule 255, which does
not change regardless of the input, is trivially decidable. But a univer-
sal system should be capable of reaction to external manipulation (the
input to the system) in order to behave as a universal system, that
is, to be capable of simulating and reaching the output of any other
universal system.
Conjecture 1: Let U be a machine capable of (efficient) universal
behaviour. Then C(U) > 0.
Conjecture 1 is one-way only, meaning that it states that an efficient
universal system should be equipped with these dynamical properties,
but the converse does not necessarily hold, given that having a large
transition coefficient by no means implies that the system will behave
with the freedom required for Turing universality (a case in point is
rule 22, which, despite having the largest transition coefficient, seems
restricted to a small number of possible evolutions).
2.2 Evidence and discussion of a qualitative characterisation
The conjecture is based on the following observations:
1. The phase transition coefficient provides information on the ability of
a system to react to external stimuli.
2. Universal systems are (efficient) information processors capable of car-
rying and transmitting information.
3. Trivial systems and random-looking systems are incapable of trans-
mitting information.
4. Trivial systems have negative C values, close to zero.
5. Rules such as 110, proven to be universal, and rule 54 (suspected to
be universal, see [18] page 697) turn out to be classified next to each
other, with a positive transition coefficient.
The capacity for universal behaviour implies that a system is capable
of being programmed and is therefore reactive to external input. It is
no surprise that universal systems should be capable of responding
to their input and doing so succinctly, if the systems in question are
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
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any input or if the output is predictable (decidable) for any input, the
system cannot be universal.
Values for the subclass of CA referred to as elementary (the sim-
plest one-dimensional) have been calculated and published in [20]. We
will refrain from evaluations of C to avoid distracting the reader with
numerical approximations that may detract from our larger goal. The
aim is to propose some basics of a behavioural characterisation of com-
putational universality.
Figure 1. ECA rule 4 is a kind of program filter that only transfers bits in
isolation (i.e. when its neighbors are both white). It is clear that one can
perform some very limited computations with this automaton.
For example, some rules, such as rule 0, don’t produce different con-
figurations relative to variant initial configurations. No matter how one
changes the initial condition, there is no way to make it produce other
than what it computes for every other initial configuration. These triv-
ial elementary CA rules are automatically ruled out, particularly the
most simple among them that cannot usually be ruled out as candi-
dates for universal behaviour given that even if they look trivial for
the simplest or for certain initial configurations, they could still be
capable of the necessary versatility and eventually be programmed in
light of the space of all possible inputs for which they may be sensitive.
The foundations of conjecture 1 and the conjecture itself are consistent
with all these observations, but it is most meaningful for systems that
are believed to be of great complexity but are usually not believed to
be malleable enough to be programmed as universal systems, such as
is the case with rule 30. If the conjecture is true, C(U) may not only
rule out systems which intuition strongly suggests are unable to behave
as universals, but it would also indicate that random-looking systems
such as rule 30 are not capable of universal computation because they
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
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also be a characterisation of the practical randomness of a system in
terms of efficient information transmission.
Rule 110, however, has a positive C value, meaning it is efficient at
carrying information from its input through the output, and that one
can actually program it to perform computations. C is compatible with
the fact that it has been proven that rule 110 is capable of universal
computation.
Figure 2. It is an open question whether ECA rule 30 can be programmed to
perform computations. Its C value is low, meaning that it is not efficient for
transferring information because it always behaves in the same fashion–too
randomly.
A universal computer (would therefore have a non-zeroC limit value.
C also captures some of the universal computational efficiency of the
computer in that it has the advantage of capturing not only whether it
is capable of reacting to the input and transferring information through
its evolution, but also the rate at which it does so. So C is an index
of both capability in principle and ability in practice. A non-zero C
means that there is a way to codify a program to make the system
behave (efficiently) in one fashion or another, i.e. to be programmable.
Something that is not programmable cannot therefore be taken to be
a computer.
In [14], Margolus asserts that reversible cellular automata (RCA)
can actually be used as computer models embodying discrete analogues
of classical notions in physics such as space, time, locality and micro-
scopic reversibility. He suggests that one way to show that a given rule
can exhibit complicated behaviour (and eventually universality) is to
show (as has been done with the Game of Life [9] and rule 110 [5, 18])
that “in the corresponding ‘world’ it is possible to have computers”
starting these automata with the appropriate initial states, with digits
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example, implement a logical gate for digital computation.
Conjecture 1 also seems to be in agreement with Wolfram’s beliefs
concerning rule 30, which according to his Principle of Computational
Equivalence (PCE) [18] may be computationally universal and still
be impossible to control so as to be able to perform a computation
(something that Wolfram has himself suggested [18]).
RCA are interesting because they allow information to propagate,
and in some sense they can be thought of as perfect computers–indeed
in the sense that matters to us. If one starts an RCA from a non-
uniformly random initial state, the RCA evolves, but because it cannot
get simpler than its initial condition (for the same reason given for the
random state) it can only get more complicated, producing a compu-
tational history that is reversible and can only lead to an increase in
entropy.
3. On the possible computational power of Busy Beaver machines
3.1 Busy Beaver machines
Rado also [16] studies the behaviour of a special kind of one-tape n-
state deterministic Turing machine, one that starts with a blank tape,
writes more non-blank symbols than any other n-state Turing machine,
and halts.
Notation: We denote by (n, 2) the class (or space) of all n-state 2-
symbol Turing machines (with the halting state not included among
the n states).
Definition 5. [16] If σT is the number of 1s on the tape of a Turing
machine T upon halting, then:
∑
(n) = max {σT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts}.
If tT is the number of steps that a machine T takes upon halting, then
S(n) = max {tT : T ∈ (n, 2) T (n) halts}.∑
(n) and S(n) as defined in 1 and 2 are noncomputable functions
by reduction to the halting problem. Yet values are known for (n, 2)
with n ≤ 4.
The Busy Beaver problem lies at the heart of what may be seen
as a paradox, for while a Busy Beaver machine of n states can be
thought of as having maximal sophistication vis-a`-vis all n state Turing
machines as regards the number of steps and printed symbols, Busy
Beaver machines can be extremely easily defined. The definition of
Busy Beaver machines describes an infinite set of Turing machines
characterised by a particular behaviour–the attribute of printing more
non-blank symbols on the tape before halting, or having the longest
runtime among all Turing machines of the same size (number of states).
Bennett’s logical depth measure is relevant in characterising the
complexity of an n-state Busy Beaver machine both in terms of size
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
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(fixed among all n-state machines) and in terms of the behaviour that
characterises this type of machine, because it follows from Rado’s def-
initions and Bennett’s concept of logical depth that Busy Beavers are
the deepest machines provided that they are the ones with the longest
history producing a string.
Yet a Busy Beaver is required to halt. When running for the longest
time or writing the largest number of non-blank symbols, bb(n) has
to be clever enough to make wise use of its resources and still save a
rule to halt. These facts may suggest the following conjectures, also
in connection with the dynamic behaviour of a set of simply described
machines with universal behaviour.
Conjecture 2:
1. (strong version): For all n > 2, bb(n) is capable of universal computa-
tion.
2. (sparse version): For some n, bb(n) is capable of universal computation.
3. (weak version): For all n > 2, bb(n) is capable of (weak) universal
computation.
4. (weakest version): For some n, bb(n) is capable of (weak) universal
computation.
It is known that among all 2-state 2-symbol Turing machines none
can be universal. Remember, however, that bb(n) as defined by Rado
[16], is a Turing machine with n states plus a special halting state.
So bb(2) is actually a 3-state 2-symbol machine in which one state is
specially reserved for halting only. By letting bb(n) be a weak universal
machine, one allows initial tape configurations other than those filled
with just a single symbol (usually called a blank tape, but blankness
is a symbol in itself), but with initial configurations simple enough so
that one can guarantee that the computation is not performed before
it is given already computed in the input encoding. In other words,
bb(n) is allowed (in the conjecture versions 2.3 and 2.4) to start either
from a periodic tape configuration or an infinite sequence of the type
accepted by a regular ω-automaton [19].
3.2 Discussion of the characterisation
If any version of the conjectures excepting conjecture 2.4 is true, the
characterisation would define a countable infinite set of universal Tur-
ing machines. Their proof may provide an interesting framework and
a possible path to take for proving a whole set of Turing machines
to be capable of universal computation on the basis of their common
dynamical properties.
Because halting machines that always halt cannot be capable of
unbounded computation, and therefore of universal Turing behaviour,
among the analytical tools necessary to demonstrate the universality
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
11
of (any) of these systems are proofs that Busy Beavers are capable of
avoiding the halting state. If one proves that Busy Beavers always halt,
that would amount to proving that they cannot be universal. But to
disprove conjectures 2.1 to 2.3 one can simply prove that at least one
Busy Beaver is not capable of a halting configuration, and a study of
this type is likely to be simplified for bb(3) or bb(4), for which Busy
Beaver functions are known and are Turing machines small enough to
be subjected to a thorough and potentially fruitful investigation in this
regard. The investigation of the behaviour of Busy Beaver machines
for other than blank tape initial configurations indicates that these ma-
chines are capable of non-trivial behaviour for other than the simplest
initial configuration (as intuition would suggest, given that if they be-
have in a sophisticated fashion for the simplest initial condition, they
may be expected to continue doing so for more complicated ones). In a
future paper we will explore the specific behaviour of these machines.
The truth of the conjectures may not seem intuitively evident to
all researchers, given that it is possible that these machines are only
concerned with producing the largest numbers by using all resources
at hand, regardless of whether they do so intelligently. However, the
requirement to halt is, from our point of view, a suggestion that the
machine has to use its resources intelligently enough in order to keep
doing its job while saving a special configuration for the halting state.
Despite the conclusion that conjecture 2.4 would imply, namely that
the property of being a Busy Beaver machine is not a characterisation
of the computational power of this easily describable set of countable
infinite machines, among the intuitions suggesting the truth of one
of these conjectures is that it is easier to find a machine capable of
halting and performing unbounded computations for a Turing machine
if the machine already halts after performing a sophisticated calculation
than it is to find a machine showing sophisticated behaviour whose
previous characteristic was simply to halt. This claim can actually be
quantified, given that the number of Turing machines that halt after
t = n for increasing values of n decreases exponentially [7, ?]. In other
words, if a machine capable of halting is chosen by chance, there is an
exponentially increasing chance of finding that it will halt sooner rather
than later, meaning that most of these machines will behave trivially
because they won’t have enough time to do anything interesting before
halting.
We have no positive proof of any version of these conjectures and
much more work remains to be done on the dynamical behaviour of
these systems. But conjectures 1 and 2 lead us to:
Conjecture 3: C(bb(n)) > 0.
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
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4. Concluding remarks
The first conjecture relates computational universality to the capacity
of a computational system to transfer information from the input to
the output and reflect the changes in the evolution of the system when
starting out from different initial configurations. We established that
the property of having a large phase transition coefficient seems nec-
essary. On the other hand, a universal system seems to be capable of
manifesting an abundance of possible evolutions and reacting to differ-
ent initial configurations in order to (efficiently) behave universally.
A second conjecture concerning the possible universality of a kind
of well-defined infinite set of abstract Busy Beaver Turing machines
was introduced–also in terms of a version of a measure of complexity
related to algorithmic complexity and the dynamic behaviour of these
machines having a particular common characterisation. The third con-
jecture relates conjectures 1 and 2.
These conjectures will be the subject of further study in a paper
to follow this one. We would like to see the conjectures proved or
disproved, but underlying the conjectures are many other interesting
questions relating to the size, behaviour and complexity of computing
machines. It would be interesting, for example, to find out whether
there is a polynomial (or exponential) trade-off between program size
and the concept of simulating a process.
References
[1] C.H. Bennett. “Logical Depth and Physical Complexity” in R. Herken
(ed), The Universal Turing Machine–a Half-Century Survey ; Oxford
University Press, p 227–257, 1988.
[2] C.H. Bennett. “How to define complexity in physics and why,” in
Complexity, entropy and the physics of information, W.H. Zurek (ed),
Addison-Wesley, p 137–148, 1990.
[3] E.R. Berlekamp, J.H. Conway and R.K. Guy. “What Is Life?” ch.
25 in Winning Ways for Your Mathematical Plays, Vol. 2: Games in
Particular, 1982.
[4] C.S. Calude and M.A. Stay. “Most programs stop quickly or never halt,”
Advances in Applied Mathematics. 40 295–308, 2005.
[5] M. Cook. “Universality in Elementary Cellular Automata,” Complex
Systems, 2004.
[6] G.J. Chaitin. Algorithmic Information Theory. Cambridge University
Press, 1987.
[7] C.S. Calude, M.A. Stay, Most programs stop quickly or never halt,
Advances in Applied Mathematics, 40, p 295-308, 2005.
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
13
[8] A. Gajardo, A. Moreira, E. Goles. “Complexity of Langton’s ant”, Dis-
crete Applied Mathematics, 117, 41–50, 2002.
[9] M. Gardner, “Mathematical Games: The fantastic combinations of
John Conway’s new solitaire game “Life””. Scientific American 223:
120–123, 1970.
[10] A. N. Kolmogorov. “Three approaches to the quantitative definition of
information.” Problems of Information and Transmission, 1(1), p 1–7,
1965.
[11] C. Langton. “Studying artificial life with cellular automata,” Physica
D 22, 120–149, 1986.
[12] L. Levin. Universal search problems, Problems of Information Trans-
mission 9 (3), p 265-266, 1973.
[13] S. Lin & T. Rado. “Computer Studies of Turing Machine Problems,”
J. ACM, 12, p 196–212, 1965.
[14] Margolus, N. “Physics-like Models of Computation”, Physica, Vol. 10D,
pp. 81–95, 1984.
[15] Wolfram’s 2, 3 Turing Machine Research Prize,
http://www.wolframscience.com/prizes/tm23/; Accessed on June,
24, 2010.
[16] T. Rado. “On Non-Computable Functions”, Bell System Technical J.
41, 877–884, 1962.
[17] S. Wolfram. “Twenty Problems in the Theory of Cellular Automata,”
Physica Scripta, T9 170–183, 1985.
[18] S. Wolfram. A New Kind of Science, Wolfram Media, 2002.
[19] T. Wolfgang. “Automata on infinite objects”, in van J. Leeuwen, Hand-
book of Theoretical Computer Science, vol. B, MIT Press, pp. 133–191,
1990.
[20] H. Zenil. “Compression-based investigation of the dynamical properties
of cellular automata and other systems,” journal of Complex Systems,
19(1), 2010.
[21] H. Zenil. “FAQs,” The Shortest Univer-
sal Machine Implementation Contest, 2008
http://www.mathrix.org/experimentalAIT/TuringMachine.html.
Complex Systems, volume (year) 1–1+
